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1-.  Introduction
The reduction in federal grants to state and local governments during the
Reagan and Bush administration was well-documented  in the popular press.
Official statistics detail this trend as well: federal grants as a percent of state
and local government  expenditures  fell from 28%  in 1980  to 20%  in 1990.1
State and federal aid as a percent of total local government  revenue  fell from
44.1%  h  1980  io  33.0%  by 1991.2 Although not every government  entity
sufiered a diminution  in resources,  for the most part this was a time of belt-
tightening for state and local governments. Not only had a revenue source
been substantially contracted, but taxpayer rnonitoring as well as other fac-
tors restricted loca,l  Eovernment  resource  allocation.
*The authors are listed in alphabetical order. Please  address  correspondence  to Shawna
Grosskopf,  Economics, Southern Illinois  University,  Carbondale, IL  62901-4515.  Dale
Boisso gratefully  acknowledges  the support  of the Summerfield G. Roberts Foundation.
We would also  like to thank Robert Schwab  for his extensive  comments on an earlier version
of this  paper presented at the  1994 ASSA meetings.  Views expressed  in this  article are
solelv those of the authors and should not be attributed  to the Federal Reserve Bank of
Da.llas  or the Federa,l  Reserve  System.
rsee  Budgel  of the  tlnited, Slales  Goaernmenl,  Analylical  Perspeciiaes, Fiscal  Year
199.{,p.169.
zSee  Gouernmenl  Finances:  1990-1991.  p.7.Since such cutbacks appear to be the norm rather than the exception,
it  would be instructive to evaluate the effect of decreased  intergovernmental
aid on the performance  of the affected  governmental  units.  Some  argue that
it will  lead affected  governments  to improve their performance. Speci{ically,
if  resources  were being wasted, then a budget reduction will  lead to  less
waste. Alternatively, one could argue that service  levels and service quality
will fa1l,  and affected  governments  will be less  likely to undertake innovative
programs. Our goal is to provide some  empirical evidence  concerning these
competing  views.
In the next section, we summarize recent theoretical and enpirical  lit-
erature pertaining  to the response  of governments to  changes  in  available
resources  a;rd citizen monitoring.  The empirical evidence  we examine is the
performance  of a sample  of local governments  during the 1980-1990  period
spanning the Reagan  and Bush administrations, which included the discon-
tinuation  of rcvenue-sh  aring.
In section  3, we introduce our method of measuring  performance. We em-
ploy a recently developed  technique to compute productivity  growth which
is particularly well-suited  to the analysis  of public sector  performance.  This
technique easily accomrnodates  multiple services  and does  not require infor-
mation  on output  or input  prices.  This  is particularly  important  for this
sector since prices (if  they exist at  all)  do not  necessarily  reflect the op-
portunity cost  of the resources  used  or services  provided. In addition, this
technique allows us to  decompose  productivity  change into  two mutually
exclusive and exhaustive components: change  in technology and change in
technical elficiency.
Simple theoretical models suggest  that reductions in budgets will lead to
improved efficiency. In terms of technology change,  we argue heuristically
that  as budgets are reduced  there is less  chance  to experiment and be inno-
vative and thus governments  will invest less  in developing a new technology
or  adopting one developed  elsewhere. Our  prelimina,ry ernpirical evidence
(based on results for a sarnple  of Illinois municipalities over the 1980-1990
period) is broadly  consistent  with these  expectations.2. Background
Although  productivity  growth  is of interest in  its  own right,  particularly
where market signals are lacking as they are in local governments, several
strands of tecent research  related to public sector behavior suggest  hypothe-
ses  that  can be tested with respect  to productivity.  In this section we briefly
summarize these.
Since  our data cover  the 1980-1990  period, we are especially  interested
in the efiects of any changes  in that  period that  would result in changes  in
productivity  in the locai public sector. One dramatic change  over that period
was the reduction in federal aid to  (state and) Iocal governments, particu-
larly the loss  of revenue  sha,ring.  As a consequence,  local governments  had to
raise an increasing sha,re  of their expenditures. At  the same  time, there was
growing resistance  to tax increases  at any level; in particular,  Proposition
13 demonstrated  a real resistance  to raising  property taxes,  the traditional
revenue  source  at the local levei.
Silkman and Young (1982) focused  on the effect of grants-in-aid on pro-
ductivity  of local governments. They argued that these  grants distort prices
(in the case  of matching grants) and "undercut the motivation of local gov-
ernments  to strive for eficiency"  (p.  384). The latter arises,  according  to
their  arguments from  both collective incentive effects and fiscal illusion ef-
fects. Collective incentive effects  arise  as  gains  from monitoring and efficiency
go increasingly to a broader constituency (state or federal taxpayers) as the
share  of outside funding increases.  This reduces  the incentives  to monitor at
the local level. Grants also obscure  the real cost of services  as they become
more complex, causing fiscal illusion.  Silkman and Young find  evidence of
such  effects  for libraries  and school  bus  transportation  in 1977-78.  Since  we
have seen  an increase  in  1980-1990  in the sha,re  of local expenditures from
own sources,  their model would suggest  that  performance (in our case  pro-
ductivity)  should improve over that  period, ceterzs  paribus.
In a more general  mode1,  Wyckofi (1990)  predicts  that bureaucrats  will
favor maximization of organizational slack (technical inefEciency)  over bud-get maximization as income increases  over time.3 In contrast to a traditional
Niskanen-type analysis based  on an agency's  demand curve, Wyckoff uses  a
utility-based  approach which ailows him to include organizational slack. If
we interpret  the decline in funding over the 1980-1990  period as a fall  in
income on the part of loca1  governments,  then his model would also predict
an increase  in productivity  over this period.
De Groot and Van der Sluis  (1987)  model  the response  of bureaucrats  to
the case  of a declining budget. They a,lso  use a uiility  function to model the
decisionmaker's  choices. They include arguments that  would allow for the
standard Niskanen budget maximization goals, but argue that  conflict min-
imization  may also be a goal.  In the context of their empirical application
(a university  department faced with  a declining budget), they model con-
flict minimization as avoida,nce  of lavofs.  If output maximization is the only
goal, however,  relatively low productivity  units would be reduced, implying
that productivity  should increase.  If conflict minimization is more important
than output  maximization, productivity  may not increase  when budgets are
reduced.
Thus earlier work suggests  that productivity  of local governments  should
increase  as they pay a greater shale of their costs out of their own sources.
Next, we turn to our measure  of productivity  and its calculation.
3. The Productivitv  Index
The productivity  measure we use to analyze performance of local govern-
ments  during  the 1980-1990  period  is the  Malmquist  productivity index. This
index was introduced  by Caves,  Christensen  and Diewert [1982]  as a theo-
retical index based  on distance  functions.  They showed  that this index was
equivalent (under certain conditionsa) to the T6rnqvist  index, which is the
discrete counterpart of the Solow growth accounting model. The T6rnqvist
index does  not require estimation of distance  functions, but rather aggregates
inputs and outputs by weighting them by their shares. Unlike Caves,  Chris-
sThis general prediction is also consietent with  Migue and Belanger (1974).
aThese  include: technology is tra.nslog,  second  order terms ate constant'  over time, firms
are cost minimizets and tevenue maxlmlzers.tensen  and Diewert, we follow Fd,re,  Grosskopf,  Lindgren and Roos (hereafter
FGLR) [1989]  and calculate  the Malmquist index directly by exploiting  the
fact that  the distance  functions on which the Malmquist index is based can
be calculated as reciprocals  of Farrell [1957]  technical efiiciency  measures.  As
shown  in FGLR, this allows  the decomposition  of productivity into changes
in efficiency (catching up) and changes  in technology (innovation).
More  formally,  if  there  are  # :  (r!,...,rjv) inputs  at  period  I :1,...,7
that are  used  to produce  outputs  y' :  (U1.,..  .  ,Afu),,  then the technology  at I
consists  of all feasible  (rt,yt),  i.e.,
S' :  {(rt,  g') '.  rt  can prod,uce  yt}.
The  output distance  function  is  due  to Ronald  Shephard  [1970]  and  is  defineds
relative  to the technology  5r as
D'.(*',a')  :  min{d  :  (#  ,y'  l0)  € st},  t  :  1,.  ..  ,T- {2)
Given rt,  the distance  function increases  gt as  much as  possible  while remain-
ing in  ,5'.  We note that  there is a close  relationship between the distance
function a,nd  the Farrell output based  measure  of technical efficiency. Specif-
ically:
Dt  (*'  .,v') =  min{d  : (xt  ,yt  lo)  e s'}
:  [max{d : (rt,,|yt) € ^9')]-'
:  rlFl@"y'),
where Fl,'(zr,  gt) is the Farrell output  based measure  of technical efficiency
(1)
(3)
sSee  Fd.re  [1988]  for a detailed discussion  of input  and output  distance functions.[Farrel1,  1957].
To illustrate  the construction of the technology S'  from  observed data
we borrow  a simple example from Fire,  Grosskopf, Lindgren and Poullier
11993].  Suppose  that one  input is used  to produce  one  output and that there




input (x)  2  5
output (y)  3  5
B uses  more  inputs than A to produce  more  output, but its average  pro-
ductivity (ylx) is 1ower,  i.e.,  Utf  r.1 :3f2  >  y6lxB:  1.  The reference
technology is created from both observations,  but the frontier  is formed by
the observation with  the highest average  product, lirm  A. 'Ihus if B is com-
pared to A, the distance  function value in this example rs
Ds(rB  ,yB)  = 213,
slDo(lu,vu)  - ,p,
which is the factor by which observation  B's outputs would have to be scaled
in order  to attain maximum average  product.
Also note that Do(rA,yA) :  I.
This is illustrated  in Figure 1.
The Malmquist productivity  change  index which we  compute here  is based
on the simple idea illustrated  above, but  it  allows for comparisons across
time.  It  also allows for many outputs and many inputs and constructs the
frontier  from  a1l  the observations  in the sample. Again, distance functions
are used to provide a measure  of deviations from maximum average  product.
SINCEoutpul
Figure 1: The Reference  TechnologySpecifically,  we  follow FGLR by defining the Malmquist index of productivity
chanse as6
As shown by  FGLR,  this  index can be partitioned  into  two  components:
efficiency  change  and technological  change.  In terms of the distance  functions
these are defined as
Efficiency  Change  {EC)  -  Dt'+r(rt+l  'y'+t) .
D'"(*',Yt)
rechnorosicar  change  (rc)  =  f  3i!l']l:'']l]. 2!!-'-v')-l'/'  ,
lDt+l(rt+1 ,yt+l) Dt"*t(*r,Ar)  )
M!'t+t  - EC.TC. (5)
If the Malmquist index takes a vaiue greater than one, then productivitiy
has improved. Values less  than one reflect deterioration in performance,  and
values o{ unity  are consistent with  no change. The efficiency change and
technical change  components  are interpreted similarly.
As in FGLR, we compute distance  functions for the Malmquist index us-
ing the nonparametric programming methods familiar from activity  analysis
and data envelopment  analysis  (DEA).? This technique  constructs  a 'grand'
trontier based  on the data from all of the observations  in the sample, some-
times re{erred to as the best practice frontier.  Referring again to Figure 1,
the best practice frontier is deterrnined  by the observations  with  the highest
average  product  or productivity.  In efiect, the Malmquist  index compares
each observation to that  frontier.  How much closer an observation qets to
oSee  also Fii.re,  Grosskopf, Nonis  and Zhang (1994) for a more accessible  exposition of
the Malmquist  index and the technique we use to calculatc it.
TSee  Charnes,  Cooper,  a.nd  Rhodes  (1978)-
(4)the frontier  is dubbed catching up (the e{ficiency  change  component); how
much the frontier  shifts at each observation's observed  input  mix  captures
innovation  (the  technical  change  component).  The  product  ofthese  two com-
ponents yields a frontier version of productivity  change. What  is especially
convenient for our application is that  no data on output  prices is required,
yet specification  of multiple outputs is easily accommodated. The linear pro-
gramming problems  used  to compute the index are included in the appendix.
4.  Data  and Results
Our data consists  of a panel  of Illinois municipalities  over  the 1980  to 1990
period. In order to calculate  our productivity index, we need  to specify  in-
puts and outputs. We have  data on safety  services,  i.e.,  the police  and fire
functions.8  As inputs we include police employment, fire employment, and
capital outlays for the police and fire functions.  Since it  is not possibie to
directly  measure the level of safety services,  we use a vector o{ character-
istics which would affect the level of safety realized by municipal  citizens.
These include the municipal population  and (the reciprocal of)  the total
crimes committed.s We also include the percent of the population who own
their homes  and the percent of the population with a high school  education.
These last two characteristics are included as fixed or intermediate outouts
over which the municipalitv has no discretion.
Our  sample includes aJI municipalities which reported the variabies in
our rnodel.  This results in an unbalanced panel with  numbers of observa-
tions ranging from 33 to 44 for this model specification.
Before turning  to our results, recall that  values of the productivity  in-
dex and its  components greater than one signal improvements; values less
than one signal deterioration of performance. Since  we compute productiv-
ity  change,  efficiency change  and technical change  for each municipality  in
oln Illinois,  education is not a municipal function.  Thus safety services typically  con-
stitute  a large share of municipal expenditures in Illinois,
9We include these  as  separate  ouiput  factors rather than the reciprocal of the crime rate
alone. This  is to explicitly  account for the different city sizes, which would be obscured
by using the crime rate.
10OUT sample for each pair of years over the 1980-1990 period, we have a large
number of disaggregated results. In order to render these a bit more compre-
hensible, we first present the mean values of the productivity index and its
components averaged across observations over time. Since the index is multi-
plicative, we compute the geometric means, which will preserve the integrity
of the decomposition at the mean. As is evident in the Table 1, mean values
fluctuate above and below one over time, with no strong apparent pattern.
The grand mean for average annual productivity growth of 1.0002 suggests
that there has been virtually no productivity growth on average over this
period.
To better see the pattern of productivity and its components over time,
Table 2 summarizes the cumulated average indexes over time. 1O This com-
pounds the productivity changes over time. Comparing the first entry in
the table with the last gives the change in overall growth in productivity
and its components. These cumulated indexes show that productivity in-
creased by about 3% in our sample on average over the 1980-1990 period.
Perhaps more interesting is the composition of that productivity change: ef-
ficiency improved by about 3%, whereas technical change exhibited a decline.
Table 1
Geometric Means by Year· 1979-88
year MALMQ TECHCH EFFCH obs
1980-81 0.9827 1.0273 0.9566 44.00
1981-82 1.0537 1.0313 1.0217 38.00
1982-83 1.0899 1.0363 1.0517 36.00
1983·84 0.8984 0.9646 0.9313 44.00
1984-85 1.0483 1.0462 1.0020 43.00
1985-86 0.9133 0.9583 0.9530 37.00
1986-87 1.0051 0.9827 1.0227 3300
1987-88 1.0013 1.0088 0.9926 36.00
1988-89 1.0134 0.9859 1.0279 36.00
1989-90 1.0126 0.9729 1.0408 35.00
grand mean 1.0002 1.0010 0.9993 38.20
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Figure 2: Cumulated efficiency change and technical change: 1980·1990
.
year MALMQ TECHCH EFFCH
1980·81 0.9827 1.0273 0.9566
1980-82 1.0354 1.0594 0.9774
1980·83 1.1284 1.0979 1.0279
1980-84 1.0138 1.0590 0.9573
1980-85 1.0628 1.1080 0.9592
1980·86 0.9707 1.0618 0.9141
1980-87 0.9756 1.0435 0.9349
1980·88 0.9769 1.0527 0.9280
1980·89 0..9899 1.0378 0.9539
1980-90 1.0024 1.0097 0.9928
Table 2
Cumulated Means by Yea.r- 197988
Figure 2 superimposes the cumula.ted. means ofthe two components ofour
productivity index) namely efficiency change and technical change, in order
to highlight the patterns observed in the tables. The difference in the trends
of the two components is striking. Although not included in our figure (since
data. are available [or only two years, 1982 and 1987L grants per capita (and
12grants in real terms) declined  over this time period on average  for our sam-
p1e  of municipalities.  Thus declines  in grants are coincident with  increases
in technical efficiency  and declines  in technical change  for the municipalities
in our sampie. Clearly, these patterns do not provide evidence  of causality.
However, they provide some  preliminary evidence  which could be employed
to further test this relationship.
In order to get some idea of whether these trends are statistically  sig-
nificant and can  be'explained'by  other factors,  we conduct  a second  stage
analysis  of the results. For each  of our three productivity measures  (the
Malmquist index, efficiency  change  and technical change)  we pooled the cal-
culated results (recall that  we have results for each of the municipalities in
our sample for every pair of years between 1980  and 1990.) We then regress
each  productivity  measure  on variables  hypothesized  to influence the perfor-
ma,nce  of safety providers. To avoid econometric  problems we do not include
as explanatory variables the factors incorporated in the specification of the
distance functions.
Based on available data, the second  stage regression  takes into account
the capital labor ratios for police and lire services  in each  period, per capita
safety service expenditure in each period, a time trend,  and dummy  vari-
ables for the counties bordering Chicago and for urban areas. The capital
labor ratios are a measure  of capital intensity, which traditionally  is expected
to be positively  related  to technical  change.  The time trend is included  to
determine whether the patterns we observed  in the graphical summary are
statistically significant. Unfortunately, we do not have disaggregated  annual
information  for grants or the percent of expenditures from loca1  sources.  In-
stead we include the per capita expenditures on sa{ety services,  which gives
us a rough proxy of the size  of the budget. We would expect the size of the
budget to be correlated with  lower effciency.
The dummy variable for municipalities in the Chicago  area is intended to
capture any effects  of the largest metropolitan area  in our sample. For exam-
ple, one  might expect that these  municipalities constitute a large competitive
area in the sense  of Tiebout.  Citizen-voters in the Chicago area have a wide
selection of communities in which to live, which may serve to improve the
performa,nce  o{ those municipalities. The dummy variable for urban areasMalmquist  Efficiency Change  Technical Cha,nge
Variable
Coefficient  Coefficient
(prob > t)  (prob > t)
Coeficient















































T4might aiso capture such Tiebout effects.
The regression  results are displayed  in Table 3. Based  on this preliminary
evidence,  we cannot reject the hypothesis  that performance, as measured  by
the productivity index,  has  remained  constant  over  the 1980-90  period  for the
municipalities in our sample. Our results suggest,  however,  that  this is due
to the fact that the two components  of productivity, namely efiiciency  change
and technical change,  are moving in opposite directions. In fact we reject the
hypothesis that there has been no change  in innovation: we observe  a signifi-
cant decline  in innovation as  measured  by our technical change  cornponent  of
productivity  over this time period. We do not have direct evidence  concern-
ing the relationship  between  productivity and local share  of financing;  that
is obviously one direction o{ future research. The only other variable which
is marginally significant at conventional levels  is the per capita expenditure
variable in the technical change  equation: higher per capita expenditure is
associated  with  greater innovation.
Given the relatively small number of observations  in any given year, we
also computed productivity  indexes  in which the only inputs were police re-
lated (most of our missing values  were due to incornplete  information on fire
services). This increased  the observations  to a range  between  45 and 61.
The regression  results for this variation confirm those of the other model.
In  this case, however, we find that  more of the coefficients  are significant.
As before,  the time trend for the Malmquist productivity index is insignif-
icant,  due again to  opposing trends in  the two  component measures)  see
Table 4.  Again, the time trend in  the technical change equation is nega-
tive and sstatistically significant. This time, however,  the time trend in the
efficiency change  equation is significant as well. Thus, as before, we find evi-
dence  that during  this period  of budgetary  pressures,  innovation  in the local
public sector was adversely  afected.  At the same  time, we see  that the efi-
ciency  component  of productivity actually improved.rr Budgetary  pressure
appea,rs  to be consistent  with improved efficiency,  but diminished innovation.
rlTo  some extent, this follows from the reduced innovation result. If the frontier  is not
advancing, then municipa.lities that  'stand still'  could actually end up being closer to the
frontier,
15Interestingly, the per capita expenditure variable is also significant: neg-
ative in the efficiency change  equation and positive in the technical change
equation. If the per capita expenditure variable is thought of as a proxy for
budget size,  then these coefficients  are consistent with our hypotheses:  rela-
tively large budgets are associated  with inefficiency,  but allow municipalities
to be relatively innovative. What would be even more in{ormative would be
information on expenditure share from own sources  instead of expenditures
per capita. That  data was  not available  from published sources  on an annua,l
basis for the municipalities in our sample.
Table 4: Regression  Results
Model with Police  Only















































The purpose of this paper is to provide some  empirical evidence  as to perfor-
mance in the local public sector during a period in which intergovernmental
aid was reduced.  Our  application covers Illinois municipalities during the
f980-1990  period. Perhaps  our major contribution  is to employ  a technique
for measuring performance  that is especially  well-suited to the public sector.
We compute Malmquist productivity  indexes  which allow for specification of
many outputs without  requiring information on output  prices. In addition,
this  productivity  index can also be decomposed  into  indexes of efficiency
change (or catching up)  and technical change (innovation).  This provides
insight into the sources  of productivity  change.
Earlier  theoretical and empirical work suggest  that  decreases  in grants
should improve performance. We find  that  during the 1980-1990  time  pe-
riod, our sample of Illinois municipalities had on average  no real discernible
pattern  of productivity  change.  On the other hand, the two  components
of productivity  suggest  that  there are some  patterns:  we found evidence of
a general tendency toward improvement in eficiency, which was apparently
ofset  by a decline in innovation over this period.
We consider our results to be only suggestive. We are unable to disag-
gregate annual information  on grants and therefore could not  directly  test
the hypothesis that  grants had a significant impact on productivity.  How-
everr  we feel that further work in this area  would be useful in providing some
insight into the potential impacts of the proposed changes  in responsibility
and financing of public services  in the future.
Appendix
For  each  municipality,  k'  :  !,... .1(  and  t:1,...,T,we  calculate
ln'"6o  ''  ,r*"'r1- 
' : -u*  d
s.t. eaH''  3 D!*t=r"k,takt,  *:7,...,M,  (6)
f=,zh'trf't  !af"t.,  n = 1,...,1{,
17"k,'20, 
k:1,....,1{.
The  other  three components are calculated similarly,  substituting  the
appropriate  period data (i.e.,  t or t -l-  1).
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